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INTRODUCTION

Workers' compensation statutes provide a form of mandatory insurance, guaranteeing compensation without regard to fault for employees who suffer injuries while in the course and scope of their
employment. 2 A benefit of this coverage is that employees who are
injured while in the course of their employment are not required to
prove negligence on the part of the employer in order to recover for
injuries sustained. Regardless of the employer's negligence, an employee covered under workers' compensation statutes recovers compensation for all compensable injuries. The compensation granted to
© Copyright held by the NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW.
Stephanie E. Frost, B.A., 2001, University of Nebraska; J.D. expected, May 2004,
University of Nebraska College of Law (NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW, Managing Editor, 2003). Special thanks to my parents, Larry and Vicky Frost, for their unending encouragement and Eric B. Brown for his review of this Note.
1. Decided per curiam.
2. For an example, see the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act, NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 48-101 to § 48-1,118 (Reissue 1998 & Cum. Supp. 2002).
*
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employees varies from state to state. Benefits may include continued
medical care for compensable injuries, lost wages, disability benefits,
vocational rehabilitation benefits, survivor benefits for spouses and
dependants, and burial allowances. 3 In most states, employers are required to purchase workers' compensation coverage through private
insurance companies. In some states, funds have been established
through which employers may obtain workers' compensation coverage
at competitive rates. Other states allow employers to "establish selfinsurance funds subject to state regulation."4
Not all employees or employers, however, are protected by state
workers' compensation statutes. In the first half of the 20th century,
most jurisdictions enacted exclusions to the provisions of their workers' compensation statutes for agricultural operations or agricultural
laborers. At the time these statutes were adopted, most agricultural
production took place on small, family-operated farms. In 1900, for
example, there were approximately 76 million people living in the
United States, one-third of whom were engaged in farming.5 Although the rationale for excluding farm laborers from workers' compensation was varied, the predominant reason was the fear of
overburdening small farmers by requiring them to comply with labor
laws. 6 Professors Arthur and Lex Larson, leading authorities on
workers' compensation law, stated the following regarding the farm
exception:
Many reasons, of varying degrees of validity, have been given to explain the
agricultural exception. The only one which seems to have much substance is
the practical administrative difficulty that would be encountered by hundreds
of thousands of small farms in handling the necessary records, insurance and
accounting .... Less convincing is the argument that the farmer cannot, like
the manufacturer, add compensation cost to the price of the product and pass
it on to the consumer .... Least convincing of all is the assertion that farm
laborers do not need this kind of protection. Whatever the compensation acts
7
may say, agriculture is one of the most hazardous of all occupations.
3. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REP. No. GAO/GGD -96-76, WORKERS COMPENSATION: SELECTED COMPARISONS OF STATE AND FEDERAL LAws GAO/GGD-9697 (1997) (summarizing benefits available to injured employees under state

workers' compensation statutes).
4. Martha L. Noble, Erosion of AgriculturalLaborExemptions in Employment Law:
Recent Developments Relevant to Arkansas, 1996 ARK.L. NOTES 71, 77 & n.42

(1996)

(citing DONALD B. PEDERSON & KEITH G. MEYER, AGRICULTURAL LAw IN A

NUTSHELL 323-25 (1995)).
5. R. NEAL PETERSON & NORA L. BROOKS, THE

CHANGING STRUCTURE OF U.S. AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION DURING THE 20TH CENTURY: 14TH ANNUAL REPORT TO THE
CONGRESS ON THE STATUS OF THE FAMILY FARM 1 (U.S. Dep't Agric., Economic

Research Service, Agric. Info. Bull. No. 671 (1993)).
6. Noble, supra note 4, at 71 & n.1 (citing Patrick M. Anderson, The Agricultural
Employee Exemption from the FairLabor StandardsAct of 1938, 12 HAMLINE L.
REV. 649, 652-57 (1989)).
7. JWM, Inc. v. Raines, 779 So. 2d 247, 252 (Ala. Civ. App. 2000) (quoting ARTHUR
LARSON AND LEx K. LARSON, LARSON'S WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAw § 53.20
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Since the advent of commercialization of the traditional family
farm, the application of the agricultural exception has become more
difficult. Farms are no longer the traditional family operations they
once were. More and more, traditional family farms are becoming
commercial operations. This transformation has resulted in legal difficulties in determining whether a farm is the traditional farm operation which the workers' compensation statutes were initially intended
to except, or whether it is a commercial operation falling within the
parameters of the acts. Larsen v. D B Feedyards exemplifies this
dilemma.
The defendant, D B Feedyards, initially operated as a traditional
farming operation, one for the exclusive benefit of cattle owned by its
shareholders, Daryl Broom and his son, Rodney Bromm. Then, between 1987 and 1990, D B Feedyards transitioned from an exclusively
traditional farming operation to one that was partially commercial in
nature. At that time, D B Feedyards began providing services for cattle owned by individuals other than the Bromms, charging a fixed
amount per head per day. At the time of trial, D B Feedyards averaged 5,000 head of cattle, one-half to three-fourths owned by persons
or entities other than the Bromms. In addition to its feedlot, D B
Feedyards owned and farmed 440 acres of land. The defendant's feedlot and farm were not distinctive operations. Rather, the operations of
each were intertwined: the crops raised on the farm were used to feed
(1997) [hereinafter LARsoN's WoRKES' COMPENSATION LAw]). Additional reasons
for agricultural exceptions to workers' compensation benefits were identified by
the North Dakota Supreme Court in Benson v. North Dakota Workmens' Compensation Bureau, 283 N.W.2d 96, 104-07 (N.D. 1979), where the court held that "the
exclusion of agricultural employees from the benefits of [workers' compensation]
is unreasonable and contrary to the expressed purpose of [North Dakota's workers' compensation act]", overruled by Haney v. North Dakota Workers Compensation Bureau, 518 N.W.2d 195 (1994). First, the court suggested that state
legislatures excluded agricultural employees to "overcome political opposition to
passage of [workers' compensation acts] by... farm-oriented legislature[s]." Benson, 283 N.W. at 104. Second, the court reasoned that compulsory coverage was
not necessary "because the 'family farm' is a closely knit community of relatives
and friends who care for each others needs." Id. at 105. Third, the Court stated
that farm employees are excluded because farm employers are unable to pay the
insurance premium. Id. The final and least convincing reason given by the
North Dakota Supreme Court was that farm work is not hazardous employment
and thus does not necessitate compulsory coverage. Id. at 104. The absurdity of
this assertion was observed by the Nebraska Supreme Court nearly 20 years ago
in Leppert v. Parker, 218 Neb. 63, 68, 352 N.W.2d 180, 183 (1984), where the
Court acknowledged that "the likelihood of being kicked in the knee by a horse or
being pulled into a combine is as hazardous as any office work covered by the
Act." The Nebraska Supreme Court's belief is further illustrated by Professors
Arthur and Lex Larsen's observation that in 1964, 3,000 agricultural workers
were fatally injured out of a total of 4,761,000, while only 2,000 manufacturing
employees were fatally injured out of 17,259,000. LARSON'S WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAw § 53.31, 9-216.
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cattle on the feedlot and manure retrieved from the feedlot was used
to fertilize the farmland.
Plaintiff Lyle D. Larsen, a professional roper, was hired by the defendant to provide general labor, including sorting and treating sick
cattle. During his employment, Larsen sustained injuries to his
thumb while roping a steer owned by an entity other than his employer. Larsen sought benefits for his work-related injury in the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court. In defense to Larsen's claim, D
B Feedyards asserted that Larsen was not entitled to workers' compensation benefits because he was employed as a farm laborer within
the meaning of section 48-106(2) of the Nebraska Revised Statutes.
As such, he was not a covered employee under the Nebraska Workers'
Compensation Act (hereinafter the "Act").
After considering the entire character of Larsen's employment, the
Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court concluded that Larsen was
not a farm or ranch hand under the exception and, as a result, was
entitled to workers' compensation benefits. Similarly, without issuing
a written opinion, the three-judge Workers' Compensation Review
Panel rejected D B Feedyards' argument that Larsen was an excepted
worker under the Act.
On appeal to the Nebraska Supreme Court, D B Feedyards again
argued that the farm laborer exclusion exempted Larsen from any entitlement to workers' compensation benefits. D B Feedyards claimed
that "because it was an employer of farm or ranch laborers, it was
excepted from the Act."8 Relying on the standards propounded in
Campos v. Tomoi 9 and Leppert v. Parker,1O the Nebraska Supreme
Court rejected D B Feedyards' assertion that it was an excepted employer. In Campos, an employee was hired to assist the defendants in
the operation of a commercial hay grinder during the winter. After
the winter had passed, the employee was to continue working on the
defendants' farms. The Nebraska Supreme Court ultimately found
that the employee, who was injured when his arm was caught in a
shaft while putting canvas on the grinder, was not a farm laborer
within the meaning the Act. In coming to this conclusion, the court
first looked at the character of the employer's operation. The court
found the operation to be commercial in nature, in part, because it had
been established both mechanically and financially to operate for a
profit. 1 Next, the court examined the nature of the employee's employment and concluded that the job being performed by the employee
at the time of his injury was contracted commercially for profit and
8.
9.
10.
11.

Larsen, 264 Neb. at 484, 648 N.W.2d at 307.
175 Neb. 555, 122 N.W.2d 473 (1963).
218 Neb. 63, 352 N.W.2d 180 (1984).
Campos, 175 Neb. at 558, 122 N.W.2d at 475.
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additional contract operations were to continue over a ten-month
12
period.
In Leppert, the Nebraska Supreme Court faced the question of
whether an employer who hires individuals to train horses on the employer's farm or ranch is an employer of farm or ranch laborers within
the meaning of section 48-106(2) of the Nebraska Revised Statutes.13
Acknowledging the standard propounded in Campos, the court stated
that the approach used in Nebraska to determine the applicability of
the farm and ranch exception is a case-by-case examination entailing
a review of the nature of the work performed by the employee, where
such work occurred, the purpose for which the employee was hired,
and the nature of the employer's occupation. The court held, however,
that the ultimate determination is the nature of the employer's business, rather than the work performed by the employee. Applying this
standard, the court concluded that the plaintiff was a farm and ranch
laborer.14
In Campos and Leppert, the Nebraska Supreme Court firmly established that while the emphasis under section 48-106(2) analysis is
on the employer's operation, a case-by-case examination, taking into
account the entire relationship of the parties, is required. 15 Moreover,
in these cases, the court stated that while the task performed by the
employee is relevant to the inquiry, the fact that an injury occurs on a
farm or ranch and the fact that the work itself could be characterized
as farm or ranch labor does not control whether the employee is cov12. Id. at 559, 122 N.W.2d at 475. In addition to emphasizing a standard which
takes into account the nature of the employer's operation and the employee's employment, the court established that employees engaged in commercial threshing
are prima facie not farm laborers within the Act. Relying upon the holdings of
two Minnesota cases, the Court stated the following conclusion: "An employe [sic]
of a farmer engaged in threshing as a business, and not in doing his own threshing or in threshing for others casually or upon an exchange-work basis, is covered
by the workmen's compensation act." 175 Neb. at 560, 122 N.W.2d at 476 (quoting Skreen v. Rauk, 27 N.W.2d 869, 872 (Minn. 1947); Charpentier v. Cumming,
227 N.W. 663 (Minn. 1929)).
13. Leppert, 218 Neb. at 64, 353 N.W.2d at 181. At the time the plaintiff suffered her
injury, the defendant was both a farmer and a rancher, owning approximately 22
quarter sections of land, 750 head of cattle, and 50 to 55 horses. At trial, the
plaintiff maintained she was a horse trainer rather than a farm or ranch laborer.
Although the record was in conflict regarding the plaintiffs actual job title, it
appears that her duties primarily entailed "cleaning of the stalls and the barns,
grooming the horses, hauling hay, and assisting in training the horses" and other
areas where needed. Id. at 65, 353 N.W.2d at 181.
14. Leppert, 218 Neb. at 68, 352 N.W.2d at 183. In coming to its conclusion, the court
stated, "[i]f22 quarter sections of land devoted to growing sugar beets, corn, pinto
beans, and alfalfa, and raising 750 head of cattle and 50 horses, do not qualify as
a 'farm and ranch,' nothing, it would seem, could fall within the definition." Id. at
67, 352 N.W.2d at 182.
15. Leppert, 218 Neb. at 67, 352 N.W.2d at 182; Campos, 175 Neb. at 557, 122
N.W.2d at 475.
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ered under the Act.16 Applying the Campos and Leppert standards in
Larsen, the court ultimately found that the tasks performed by Larsen
when and where he was injured benefited D B Feedyards' commercial
enterprise, rather than its farming operation. Consequently, the
court, in a three to two decision, issued a per curiam finding that Larsen was not an excepted farm laborer.
The purpose of this Note is to analyze the consequences of the Nebraska Supreme Court's holding in Larsen. Part II of this Note discusses the background and development of the agriculture exception
in Nebraska. Part III first assesses the Nebraska Supreme Court's
analysis of Larsen v. D B Feedyards,then explores the consequences of
the court's effective abrogation of the agricultural exception as it existed prior to August, 2003. Finally, this Note concludes by discussing
the necessity of legislative action to clarify the exception and the Legislature's subsequent response.
II. BACKGROUND
In most cases dealing with agricultural exceptions to workers' compensation acts, the decisive question to determine whether an employee is covered by workers' compensation is the nature of the
employee's employment, not the nature of the employer's business (i.e.
whether it is agricultural or commercial in nature).17 As noted by
Professors Arthur and Lex Larson, "[i] f the employee's work is agricultural in nature, it is no less so because the employer happens to be a
factory or chemical company."ls Similarly, if an employer's business
is agriculture, but the employee's work is nonagricultural or significantly disassociated from the normal routine of running a farm, the
agricultural exception does not apply.19 In contrast, however, the decisive question in Nebraska has traditionally been the nature of the
employer's business, rather than the nature of the employee's
employment.
16. Larsen v. D B Feedyards, Inc., 264 Neb. 483, 490, 648 N.W.2d 306, 311 (2002)
(per curiam). In Campos v. Tomoi, the Court stated:
A workman is not a farm laborer simply because at the moment he is
doing work on a farm; nor because the task on which he is engaged happens to be what is ordinarily considered farm labor. The employee of an
implement dealer does not become a farm laborer while engaged in correcting the behavior of a self-binder in the grain field of the owner, a
farm and customer of the dealer .... Neither the pending task nor the
place where it is being performed is the test. The whole characterof the
employment must be looked to determine whether he is a farm laborer.
Campos, 175 Neb. at 558, 122 N.W.2d at 475 (quoting Peterson v. Farmers State
Bank, 230 N.W. 124, 124 (1930)) (emphasis in original).
17. LARSON'S WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAw § 53.31; see also JWM, Inc. v. Raines,
779 So. 2d 247, 249 (Ala. Civ. App. 2000).
18. LARsoN's WORKERS'COMPENSATION LAw § 53.31.
19. Id.
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In 1913, the Nebraska Legislature enacted its exception excluding
employers of farm laborers from the protections of the Nebraska
Workers' Compensation Act. 20 Up until August of 2003, the farm exclusion, section 48-106(2), provided that "employers of farm or ranch
laborers" are "declared not to be hazardous occupations and not within
the provisions of the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act."21 The
Nebraska Supreme Court had acknowledged that the emphasis of this
version of the exception was the minority view. In Keefover v.Vasey,
the Supreme Court stated "it is worthy of note that in these other
states the emphasis seems to be placed upon the exclusion of the laborer, while in this state it rests upon the exclusion of the employer of
such labor." 22 The court further noted that because Nebraska workers' compensation law is statutory, the focus of the farm labor exception is a legislative prerogative. 23 Consequently, the court was bound
by the statutory language, despite however unpopular, inappropriate,
and outdated the statute's focus may have been.
Focusing the farm and ranch exemption on the employer resulted
in an analysis of the nature of the employer's business operation when
determining whether or not a claimant was covered by the provisions
of the Act. Such an analysis has become more difficult, since the exemption was enacted around the turn of the twentieth century. No
longer are farms the small, family enterprises they once were. By
1992, the number of people employed in farming had been reduced to
an estimated 3.1 million. 24 More and more, farms are becoming large
commercial conglomerates. As one court commented, "[t]he modern
farm is no longer a sole farmer with five to ten employees. Rather,
many farms are just one cog in a giant structure that involves every
process necessary to bring the goods to the supermarket. Some farming businesses even own the stores." 25 The increase in farm size, constantly changing methods and machinery, and spiraling costs have
"spawned a multitude of commercial business which provide equipment and specialized services for farmers and ranchers." 26 An example of this result is seen in the animal production sector of agriculture.
In 1970, two percent of hogs produced in the United States were
20. 1913 Neb. Laws, ch. 198, § 6(2), 580. In 1945, the statute was amended to exclude employers of ranch laborers as well. 1945 Neb. Laws, ch. 111, § 1, 356.
21. NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-106 (Reissue 1998 & Cum. Supp. 2002).
22. Keefover v. Vasey, 112 Neb. 424, 427, 199 N.W. 799, 800 (1924).
23. Id.
24. Noble, supra note 4, at 72 & n.2 (citing U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REP.
No. GAO/RCED-95-104FS, U.S. AGRICULTURE: STATUS OF THE FARM SECTOR 8-9

(1995)).
25. U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. Alvarez, 657 S.W.2d 463, 468-69 (Tex. App. 1983).
26. Larsen v. D B Feedyards, Inc., 264 Neb. 483, 489, 648 N.W.2d 306, 311 (2002)
(per curiam) (citing Hawthorne v. Hawthorne, 184 Neb. 372, 378, 167 N.W.2d
564, 567 (1969)).
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raised by farmers in a commercial context. By 1990, nearly 21 percent
of hogs were produced in such operations. "In these production systems, a great deal of agricultural production activity has moved from
relatively small individual farmsteads to large, industrialized agricultural production facilities, [many of which] are divisions of sophisticated, well-financed businesses with management personnel and a
7
large, relatively permanent labor force." 2
The commercialization of the modern farm has had a significant
impact on workers' compensation. In some instances, modernized
farms have spawned commercial businesses "separate and distinct
from farming and ranching."28 Because these commercial oriented
businesses have not eliminated the traditional farm operations altogether, 2 9 in many situations, the farm and commercial operations coexist. A consequence of the intermingling of these two types of
ventures is that in a growing number of cases, it has become more
difficult for courts to make the distinction between the two. Professors Arthur and Lex Larson state that some agricultural activities are
merely one stage in a commercial operation, which creates a "problem
of determining where to draw the line between the last stages of the
agricultural process and the first stage of the industrial process."30
In Nebraska, as well as the majority of other states, the courts
have repeatedly held that commercial operations, although occurring
in an agricultural setting or agricultural in nature, are not exempt
from the Act.31 However, simply because part of an employer's business is commercially oriented does not mean that its entire operation
falls within the Act. In Nebraska, it has long been recognized that an
employer can be engaged in two separate enterprises, one agricultural
and one commercial; the agricultural enterprises excepted from the
provisions of the Act, while the commercial enterprise not excepted. 3 2
27. Noble, supra note 4, at 72 (citation omitted).
28. Larsen, 264 Neb. at 489, 648 N.W.2d at 311.
29. See Brown v. Leavitt Lane Farm, 215 Neb. 522, 527, 340 N.W.2d 4, 8 (1983) (stating that "one employer may engage in two separate businesses, one subject to the
workmen's compensation law and one exempt from that law").
30. LARSON'S WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAw § 53.31, 9-219.
31. Hawthorne v. Hawthorne, 184 Neb. 372, 378, 167 N.W.2d 564, 567 (1969). See,
e.g., LARSON'S WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAw § 75.03(5), at 75-13 (1999) (stating

that "[slometimes intensive specialization, if carried too far, is enough to transform agriculture to commerce").
32. Bartunek v. Becker, 222 Neb. 126, 382 N.W.2d 300 (1986). In Bartunek, the court
stated that "[ain employer may be engaged in two businesses is not unique or
unheard of in the law. It has long been recognized in this jurisdiction." Id. at
129, 382 N.W.2d at 301-02. The court further noted that is not uncommon for one
of those two businesses to be a farming operation exempt from the Act and a nonfarming operation covered by the Act. Id. Ultimately, the court held that the
claimant, who was injured while working in a body shop located on a farm, was
covered under the provisions of the Act, despite the fact that, at other times, he
was also compensated for doing farm labor. See also Kaplan v. Gaskill, 108 Neb.
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Often, a discernable separation exists between the operations, allowing the courts to easily determine to which operation the employee's services were directed. In other situations, like D B
Feedyards', the farming and commercial operations are inherently intertwined, making it nearly impossible for a court to make a meaning33
ful distinction between the two.
III.
A.

LEGAL ANALYSIS

The Court's Treatment of Larsen v. D B Feedyards

In Larsen v. D B Feedyards, Inc., the Nebraska Supreme Court
faced a situation where the distinction between the agricultural and
commercial nature of the employer's business operations was nearly
nonexistent. The feedlot operated by D B Feedyards serviced its own
cattle as well as cattle owned by other individuals and entities. Although the feedlot originally serviced only cattle owned by the defendant, at the time Larsen sustained his personal injury, only one-half
to one-fourth of the cattle fed and housed by D B Feedyards were
owned by the corporation. At trial and on appeal to the Nebraska Supreme Court, Larsen argued that because the defendant was primarily engaged in a commercial enterprise, it was not an excepted
employer and that, therefore, Larsen was covered by the Act.34 D B
Feedyards, on the other hand, argued that "because it was engaged in
the business of farming or ranching, it [was] an excepted employer
under section 48-106(2)" and, as a result, Larsen was not covered by
the Act.35
In order to distinguish between the two forms of employment, the
court ultimately propounded a fact-intensive inquiry which, on its
face, appeared to comport with the statutory requirements of the version of section 48-106(2) as it then existed, as well as established case
law. The court, however, took the analysis one step further by employing an analysis where the decisive question was the nature of the
employee's employment at the time of injury.
In its analysis, the Larsen court noted that recent case law, in
keeping with the language of section 48-106(2), had emphasized that
it is the nature of the employer's business, rather than the nature of
the employee's activities, which determines the applicability of the exception. The court further stated that the Workers' Compensation
court's analysis properly focused on the activities of the employer. In
Leppert v. Parker, the Nebraska Supreme Court stated that the task
455, 459-60, 187 N.W. 943, 945 (1922) (concluding the workers' compensation act
does not contemplate that a person be engaged in only one regular business).
33. Larsen, 264 Neb. at 492, 648 N.W.2d at 312 (Stephan, J., dissenting).
34. Larsen, 264 Neb. at 487-88, 648 N.W.2d at 310.
35. Id.
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performed by the employee at the time of injury is relevant to the inquiry. 36 While- the Larsen court acknowledged the relevancy of the
employee's task, it was more than relevant evidence in its final determination. Despite D B Feedyards' contention to the contrary, the
court found that it operated a commercial operation as well as a farm
operation. Strong evidence in support of this finding was the fact that
one-half to three-fourths of the cattle fed by the corporation were
owned by customers of D B Feedyards. Having established that D B
Feedyards ran two operations, the court's next objective was to establish for which operation Larsen was employed at the time he sustained his injury. To make this determination, the court looked at the
tasks performed by Larsen when he was injured. The court emphasized that at the time of injury, Larsen was roping cattle owned by one
of D B Feedyards' customers. This fact supported the trial court's
finding that Larsen's employment at the time of injury was for the
benefit of the commercial operation rather than the defendant's farm
operation.
By focusing on the employee's activities at the time he was injured,
the court set a new precedent for circumstances where the employer's
business is comprised of more than one operation. After Larsen, the
analysis necessarily focused on more than the nature of the employer's
operation. In the wake of the court's opinion, it was necessary for the
workers' compensation and appellate courts to look at the work performed by the employee to determine which operation benefited from
the employee's work. Consequently, when employers were engaged in
farming and ranching of their own and others' land and livestock, the
analysis took into consideration the nature of the employer's business,
but the final determination ultimately turned on the work performed
by the claimant at the time he or she was injured. In the words of
Justice Gerrard, an employer's liability "turns not on whose ox was
37
gored, but on whose steer was roped."
B.

Consequences of Larsen v. D B Feedyards

By differentiating the claimant's type of employment in Larsen by
the ownership of the particular cattle he was roping at the time he
sustained his injury, the Nebraska Supreme Court brought Nebraska
36. Leppert v. Parker, 218 Neb. 63, 67, 352 N.W.2d 180, 182 (1984); see also Campos
v. Tomoi, 175 Neb. 555, 122 N.W.2d 473 (1963). Taking into consideration the
entire relationship of the parties, the Campos court ultimately found that the
plaintiff was employed to operate a bulldozer and thus not as a farm laborer. In
its analysis, the court stated that "[t]he whole character of the employment must
be looked at to determine whether he [the employee] is a farm laborer."). Id. at
555, 122 N.W.2d at 475 (quoting Peterson v. Farmers' State Bank, 230 N.W. 124,
124 (1930)).
37. Larsen, 264 Neb. at 494, 648 N.W.2d at 314 (Gerrard, J., dissenting).
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in line with the majority farm exception analysis when an employer is
comprised of two operations, one commercial and one farm oriented.
The court's decision was adamantly rejected by Justices Stephan and
Gerrard, who each wrote separate dissenting opinions. In the view of
both Justices, the court was incorrect in distinguishing between D B
Feedyards' two types of employment. In the initial paragraph of his
dissent, Justice Stephan stated the following:
I cannot accept the majority's premise that D B Feedyards was engaged in two
separate and distinct enterprises, one agricultural and one commercial, differentiated solely by the ownership of the cattle on feed. Nor can I accept the
majority's decision to determine the applicability of the farm or ranch laborer
based exemption upon the narrow 3and
irrelevant question of whose steer was
8
being roped at the time of injury.

Justice Stephan went on to state that the "fact-intensive nature" of
the inquiry employed by the majority in Larsen "benefits neither employers nor employees." 39 Justice Stephan was entirely correct.
The analysis employed by the court in Larsen was a fact intensive
inquiry which looked backward in time, rather than forward. In order
to determine whether an employee was excluded from the statute, it
was necessary for a court to look at the nature of the employee's activities at the time he suffered his injury. This requirement, however,
poses significant problems. Because agriculture and its commercial
counterparts are inherently unpredictable, the activities of any given
employee on any given day are unforeseeable. Consequently, it is not
within an employer's frame of knowledge to know whether an employee will be performing work which benefits the employer's agricultural operation or whether the employee's work will be for the benefit
of the employer's commercial operation. This lack of knowledge
means that an employer is unable to predict whether or not workers'
compensation insurance must be carried to protect the employee.
Even if an employee primarily works for the benefit of the farm operation, the sporadic occasions when he or she works for the commercial
operation puts the employer at risk for tremendous personal liability
if he has failed to obtain workers' compensation insurance.
Under workers' compensation, injured employees are entitled to
medical expenses as well as lost wages. While wage replacement varies among the states, most provide injured employees with one-half to
two-thirds their average weekly wage, tax free. 4o In Nebraska, benefits are governed by Nebraska Revised Statute section 48-121 (Cum.
Supp. 2002). Under section 48-121, if an employee is rendered totally
disabled as a result of a compensable work-related injury, the em38. Id. at 491, 648 N.W.2d at 312 (Stephan, J., dissenting).
39. Id. at 493, 648 N.W.2d at 313 (Stephan J., dissenting).
40. Heather L. Palmer, Workers' Compensation and the AgriculturalExemption: An
American Tragedy for Farmers and Injured Farmhands, 4 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L.
491, 497 (1999).
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ployee receives two-thirds his average weekly wage, 4 1 not to exceed
the statutory maximum specified in section 48-121.01 of the Nebraska
Revised Statutes,42 for the duration of the disability. If an employee
suffers only partial disability to his back, neck or head, he is entitled
to two-thirds his average weekly wage multiplied by his loss of earning capacity for a total of 300 weeks.4 3 If an employee sustains permanent injury to a "scheduled member," which includes fingers, hands,
arms, toes, feet, legs, eyes, ears, and nose, the employee receives twothirds his average weekly wage for the statutorily specified number of
weeks multiplied by his permanent impairment. 4 4 In addition to the
weekly wage benefits specified above, the Nebraska's Workers' Compensation Act provides that all medical expenses stemming from a
45
compensable injury are the liability of the employer or its insurer.
41. In Nebraska, the average weekly wage of employees is covered by NEB. REV.
STAT. § 48-121 (Reissue 1998 & Cum. Supp. 2002).
42. NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-121.01(1)(b) (Reissue 1998) provides that the maximum
weekly benefit beginning January 1, 1996 and each January 1 thereafter shall be
"computed to the next higher whole dollar of the state average weekly wage."
The maximum weekly benefit for 1996 was $409.00, for 1997 it was $427.00, for
1998 it was $444.00, for 1999 it was $468.00, for 2000 it was $487.00, for 2001 it
was $508.00, and for 2002, the maximum benefit was $528.00. NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 48-121.01(2) provides that employees covered under the Act shall not receive a
weekly benefit less than $49.00 per week. The minimum benefit to which employees are entitled has remained the same since mid-April of 1973. For the two
years prior to 1973, the minimum benefit for the first 300 weeks of benefits was
$40 and for the two years prior that, the minimum benefit was only $35.00. NEBRASKA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COURT, TABLE OF MAXIMUM/MINUM COMPENSATION BENEFITS (March 8, 2004), available at www.nol.org/home/WC/miscd

benefits.pdf.
43. See, e.g., Nordby v. Gould, Inc., 213 Neb. 372, 374, 329 N.W.2d 118, 119 (1983)
(stating that impairments to the body as a whole are compensated in terms of
loss of earning capacity while impairments to scheduled members are compensated on the basis of physical function loss).
44. The loss of a thumb entitles an employee to weekly benefits for 60 weeks, the first
finger for 35 weeks, the second finger for 30 weeks, the third finger for 20 weeks,
and the "little finger" for 15 weeks. NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-121 (Reissue 1998 &
Cum. Supp. 2002). If an employee loses a "great toe," they are entitled to 30
weeks of weekly benefits. Id. The loss of any other toe entitles them to benefits
for 10 weeks. If a hand is lost, the employee receives 175 weeks of benefits and
for the loss of an arm they receive benefits for 225 weeks. The loss of a foot entitles an employee to 150 weeks of benefits and a lost leg is worth 215 weeks of
benefits. A lost eye or ear entitles the employee to 25 weeks of benefits while the
loss of hearing in an ear entitles the employee to benefits for 50 weeks. If an
employee loses his nose, he will receive benefits for 50 weeks. If an employee
loses the use of more than one member, but is not rendered disabled, he will
receive benefits for each member, with the periods of benefits running consecutively. If an employee loses either both hands, both arms, both feet, both legs,
both eyes, hearing in both ears, or any two thereof in one accident, he is considered totally and permanently disabled and is compensated according to section
48-121(1). NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-121 (Reissue 1998 & Cum. Supp. 2002).
45. NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-120 (Reissue 1998 & Cum. Supp. 2002).
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Depending on the severity of the employee's injury, liability for medical expenses can be tremendous.
The immensity of potential total liability for a work related accident is best seen through a hypothetical illustration:
In 2002, employee A, a 35 year old tractor-trailer driver, suffers a compensable low-back injury which a trial court determines to have rendered him totally disabled. 4 6 At the time A sustained his work related injury, he had an
average weekly wage of $950.00. Two-thirds A's average weekly wage results
in a weekly benefit of $600.00. 4 7 In 2002, the maximum benefit an employee
is eligible to receive is $528.00. Because the weekly benefit to which A is entitled exceeds the statutory maximum, A is entitled only to the statutory maximum of $528.00 per week for the remainder of his life. IRS life expectancy
tables estimate that the life expectancy of a 35 year old individual is 47.3
years. 4 8 $528.00 multiplied by 2459.60 weeks (52 weeks multiplied by 47.3
years) results
in a total benefit of $1,298,668.80 over the employee's
49
lifetime.

Now, if A's employer knew prior to the A's injury that it was not
exempt from the Act and had acted appropriately by obtaining workers' compensation insurance, the employer's overall liability would be
minimal. The only out of pocket expenses the employer would be faced
with would include any applicable deductibles and possible increases
to its workers' compensation premiums, which are based on the number of claims an individual employer submits. However, if the employer failed to obtain workers' compensation insurance because of the
mistaken belief that it was exempt from the Act, the employer would
find itself personally liable for all A's medical bills and weekly benefits.5O As the calculation above demonstrates, without workers' com46. Disability in workers' compensation is a legal term determined by a judge or vocational rehabilitation counselor, rather than a medical term determined by a
medical doctor.
47. To determine the benefits to which an employee is entitled, the sum of his or her
gross pay for the 26 weeks prior to the accident is divided by number of weeks in
which the employee received a paycheck. If an employee received a paycheck for
only 20 weeks prior to the accident, the sum of those paychecks would be divided
by 20 weeks. Once the average weekly wage is determined, it is multiplied by
two-thirds. In this example, the calculation is as follows: average weekly wage =
$900.00 x 2/3 = $600.00 (rounded to the nearest cent).
48. IRS LIFE EXPECTANCY TABLE, at http://www.retirelink.com/education/LifeExpectancy.html (last visited February 10, 2004).
49. In addition to the weekly benefit, A's employer or its insurer is also responsible
for all medical expenses related to A's injury. In some instances, medical expenses can far exceed an employee's wage replacement. For example, in 1995, a
migrant farm worker who lost three limbs in a farming accident in Idaho incurred $750,000 in medical expenses. Norma Wagner, Farm Workers: A Net for
Migrants Who Slip Through InsuranceCracks, SALT LAKE TRm., Jan. 24, 1997, at
Al.
50. In the Nebraska Legislature floor debate over LB 417, Senator Matt Connealy
argued that if employers are not required to carry workers' compensation insurance for their employees, such employees should be covered under health and/or
accident insurance. In support of Senator Connealy's proposal, Senator Bromm
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pensation insurance, A's employer's personal liability, absent general
liability insurance, exceeds one million dollars.
Prior to Larsen, an agricultural employer could determine whether
he was an exempted employer under the Act by reviewing the nature
of his agricultural operation. If the operation was traditional in nature, the employer was excepted. If the operation was commercial in
nature, the employer was not excepted. This easy analysis no longer
existed after Larsen. Rather, in order to determine whether it was
excepted under the farm laborer exception, an employer had to look
into the future to determine what specific activities an employee
would be performing when he sustained an injury. Because we lack
the ability to foresee future events, an agricultural employer that is
engaged in both commercial and traditional farm operations is unable
to determine whether or not it is excepted from the Act. To protect
itself from tremendous personal liability after Larsen, it was necessary for commercial agriculture employers to obtain workers' compensation insurance, despite the fact that part of their operations are
excepted under the Act. Consequently, to all extents and purposes,
Larsen abrogated the farm exception for agricultural employees engaged in both farm and commercial operations.
As Justice Stephan stated in his dissenting opinion to Larsen, not
only does the analysis employed by the majority fail to benefit employers, it also fails to benefit employees.51 Because of the uncertainty of
whether or not they were excepted from the Act, some agricultural
employers may have chosen to tempt fate by not obtaining workers'
compensation insurance. If the dice were rolled and the employer lost,
the employee also lost. This is so because without the protection of
workers' compensation coverage, an injured employee may be forced to
sue his employer to collect the benefits and medical expenses to which
he is entitled.
While it is true that some employers may have general liability
insurance policies upon which they can rely, such policies often provide inadequate coverage.5 2 In fact, the limits of general liability polistated that currently, most health insurance policies have provisions excluding
health benefits for employees who are eligible for workers' compensation and
should have been covered by workers' compensation insurance. Senator Bromm
stated that if an employer believes himself to be exempt from the Act and does
not carry workers' compensation insurance, he becomes personally liable for all
the employee's medical bills since, in many instances, the employee's health insurance will not cover medical expenses related to work related injuries. Floor
Debate on LB 417, 97th Leg., 10451-53 (Feb. 22, 2002) (statements of Senators
Matt Connealy and Curt Bromm).
51. Larsen v. D B Feedyards, Inc., 264 Neb. 483, 493, 648 N.W.2d 306, 313 (2002)
(per curiam) (Stephan, J., dissenting).
52. Noble, supra note 4, at 500 (citing Norma Wagner, Farm Workers: A Net for Migrants Who Slip Through Insurance Cracks, SALT LAKE TRIa., Jan. 24, 1997, at

Al).
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cies are often inadequate to cover medical expenses incurred by the
injured farm employee. 53 For example, in Benson v. North Dakota
Workmen's Compensation Bureau,54 the injured employee's employer
did not carry voluntary workers' compensation insurance because it
would be "too costly." Instead, the employer believed he had enough
private insurance that would take care of any employee accident.
However, the farm liability insurance policy carried by the employer
55
only provided $2,000 in no-fault medical benefits.
Even greater losers, however, are those employees whose employers failed to obtain any type of liability insurance coverage. The only
remuneration these employees will receive is what their employers
can personally afford. If the employee's workers' compensation entitlement exceeds one million dollars, as in the earlier hypothetical, the
likelihood of an employer, especially a small traditional and commercial agricultural employer, being able to cover its entire liability is
highly unlikely. Consequently, the employee is not afforded full recovery for either his injuries or his loss of earnings.
IV.

LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE TO SECTION
48-106 AMBIGUITY

To prevent the potential detrimental effect of future farm exception analyses after Larsen, a clear definition of who constituted and
excepted farm employer, which did not turn on "[d]istinctions that are
too subtle to be understood or anticipated," 56 needed to be established.
As Justice Gerrard noted in his dissent, the proper forum to provide
this definition was the Nebraska Legislature. Approximately one year
after the court issued its opinion in Larsen, the Nebraska Legislature
did react to the inherent ambiguity of section 48-106 as it existed at
the time of Larsen by the passage of LB 210. The result was a complete rewriting of the statute. As it stands now, section 48-106(d) excepts from coverage of the Act services performed by a worker "when
performed for an employer who is engaged in an agricultural operation and employs unrelated employees" unless the employer employs
ten or more, full-time, unrelated employees for thirteen weeks.5 7
53. Id.
54. Benson v. N.D. Workmens' Comp. Bureau, 283 N.W.2d 96 (N.D. 1979) (holding
that excluding agricultural employees from the benefits of workers' compensation
is unreasonable and contrary to the expressed purpose of North Dakota's workers' compensation act"), overruled by Haney v. N.D. Workers Comp. Bureau, 18
N.W.2d 195 (1994) (finding the agricultural exception to be constitutional).
55. Benson, 233 N.W.2d at 105.
56. Larsen, 264 Neb. at 485, 648 N.W.2d at 315.
57. NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-106 (Cum.Supp. 2003).
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Eliminated entirely from the statute was the now ambiguous language "employers of farm or ranch laborers."S8 In its place, the Legislature has substituted the broad wording of "agricultural operation"
which seems to encompass both the traditional farming operations
that were excluded under the pervious version of section 48-106, as
well as those commercial agricultural operations which had in recent
years been deemed not excluded under section 48-106. By incorporating the broader new language and by placing limitations on the number of unrelated employees an employer may employ and still exempt
from the requirement of carrying workers' compensation insurance,
the Legislature has clarified the inherent ambiguity of the pervious
version of the statute and dealt with the problem of commercial agricultural operations, which the Nebraska courts were disinclined to exempt from coverage.
Unfortunately, in its clarification of the statute, the Legislature
missed an opportune time to remedy injustices encountered by the
thousands of agricultural employees who are injured in work-related
agricultural accidents yearly. Agriculture has long been recognized as
one of the most hazardous industries in the United States. In 2002,
789 people died while involved with agricultural work in the United
States.59 The rate for non-fatal injuries in the agricultural sector is
similarly substantial. While there is no single, continuous source of
national non-fatal agricultural injury data, it was estimated that
there were 200,000 work-related agriculture related injuries in
1993.60 In Nebraska, agriculture wasn't merely one of the top ranking
hazardous employment sectors, it was the most hazardous, accounting
for 83 deaths in 2002.61
Despite the well documented hazards of agricultural employment,
a number of states, Nebraska included, continue to exempt employment in that sector from their workers' compensation statutes. In
part, this is due to the belief that "farming, unlike other professions,
cannot effectively pass on the increased costs of agricultural accidents
58. Id.

59.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, TABLE 2:
FATAL OCCUPATIONAL INJURIES AND EMPLOYMENT BY INDUSTRY 2002 (2003), avail-

able at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/cfoi.t02.htm.
60.

NATIONAL AG SAFETY DATABASE,

61.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, TABLE 5:
FATAL OCCUPATIONAL INJURIES BY STATE AND EVENT OR EXPOSURE, 2002 (Feb. 6,

AGRICULTURAL INJURY, FACT SHEET (2003),
available at www.cdc.gov/nasd/docs/d000901-d001000/d000984/d000984.html.

2003), available at http://www.bls.gov.news.release/cfoi.t05.htm. It should be
noted that these statistics stand in stark contrast to section 48-106's prior declaration that farming is not hazardous. This statement was completely eliminated
from the new version of section 48-106 without discussion of the original drafters'
intent in including that misguided statement in the original version of the
statute.
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and injuries to consumers." 62 Furthermore, the belief predominates
that the farmers' related insurance premiums are cost prohibitive in a
farm economy already financially strapped. 6 3 Whether these fears are
justifiable will not be argued in this Note. Rather, it will merely be
pointed out that the financial savings of the farmer stemming from
the exemption from workers' compensation comes at the expense of
the farmer's employees. While individual health insurance may cover
medical bills stemming from an injury not covered by workers' compensation, such insurance does not provide reimbursement for lost
wages, both past and future, as a result of a work related injury. Similarly, as previously noted, general liability policies carried by farmers
are often inadequate to fully compensate an injured farm laborer.
Such policies do not always provide coverage for work-related injuries
and are often inadequate to cover basic medical expenses incurred
while treating work-related injuries.64 In addition, when seeking remuneration through common law personal injury claims, farm laborers must prove that the negligence of their employer was the legal and
proximate cause of the employees injuries and rebut the plethora of
defenses which can bar their recovery, including assumption of risk,
contributory negligence, and the negligence of fellow employees. 6 5
It was clear from Larsen that steps needed to be taken by the Legislature to clear up the ambiguity of section 48-106. The Legislature
has done so and for clarification purposes, has done a fine job. However, in rewriting the statute in a more inclusive manner than the
preceding statute had been interpreted in recent years, the Legislature protected the finances of the farmers at the expense of their often
low-paid, minimally educated employees. Author Heather Palmer had
it partially correct when she characterized the agriculture exemption
in workers' compensation as an American tragedy for farmers and injured farmhands. 6 6 In Nebraska, it is simply anAmerican tragedy for
injured farmhands.

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Palmer, supra note 40, at 492.
See Palmer, supra note 40.
Id. at 492,
Id. at 493.
Id. at 497.

